

Helpdesk Query

August 2009

Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration

Commissioned by the
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
(GFN-SSR)

Mark Knight
Independent SSR and DDR Consultant

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

gfn·ssr
global facilitation network
for security sector reform

SSR: Post-conflict Integration

Prepared on behalf of GFN-SSR by:

Mark Knight
Independent SSR and DDR Consultant

With expert advice from:

Dylan Hendrickson
King's College London

Disclaimer:

**The views represented in this paper are
those of the authors only**

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1. INTRODUCTION	6
2. APPROACHES TO MILITARY INTEGRATION	8
3. THEMATIC ISSUES	12
3.1 Political Solution	12
3.2 Military integration as ‘credible signs of intent’	12
3.3 Design and implementation	14
3.4 The Economic Imperative	15
3.5 Military integration within a Wider Approach	16
3.6 Inclusive Structures	18
3.7 Police Reform and integration	19
3.8 Military integration and civilian reintegration	21
3.9 The Role of International Actors	22
4. CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS IDENTIFIED	25
ANNEX A: Primary case studies	27
ANNEX B: Secondary case studies	43
ANNEX C: Bibliography	53

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as part of a help-desk support to inform HMG to report on its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration; in particular, examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military forces (police, armed police, intelligence, etc), and creation of new security structures (industrial security forces, border police, etc) into which ex-combatants are then integrated.

One of the most contentious current challenges of the Nepali peace process is related to the future of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) - the military organisation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M). The main parties struggle over the key questions of whether, how and according to what criteria the PLA should be integrated into the Nepali Army (NA) or other security forces. Furthermore, the question of integration of the PLA is linked to other issues, such as the prevalence of other militias and armed groups, and a broader debate on the cornerstone of a national defence strategy.

This paper provides a synthesis of key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues relating to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war. As well as drawing upon existing studies the paper synthesises themes by examining the data from eight primary and fifteen secondary case studies, drawn from various sources.

An overarching and consistent theme throughout all case studies examined is the requirement, with integration endeavours, to view the process as the outcome. The integration of non-state military forces into the state security apparatus is an element of wider post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and as such the outcome is rarely predictable. An effective and sustainable solution from one context cannot be assumed to represent a template solution for other contexts. Support to the process of decision-making, and bodies established to implement decisions has been seen to be an effective strategy for external assistance.

The paper has highlighted the complex and diverse nature of efforts to integrate ex-combatants into state security forces. There exist as many approaches and solutions as there are contexts in which they have been attempted. An examination of the available case study material has, however, provided some consistent themes that have been highlighted throughout the paper as lessons identified.

Approaches to military integration

In contexts of political defeat or stalemate, where neither military force achieved a decisive victory, a 1+1=3 formula might usefully be applied. This indicates that two separate forces integrating should result in a new third force. Neither of the existing military structures, personnel or cultures should dominate the new force.

Political Solution

The political solution to ending the conflict is the most pressing contextual factor in which the integration will be implemented. The process will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.

Military integration as 'credible signs of intent'

An integration process requires parties to a conflict, and individuals engaged in the conflict, to forgo the instruments that are seen to provide for their security. Therefore intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge around the military integration issue.

Progress on integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation and constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups.

Design and Implementation

Poorly conceived and implemented processes are more likely to fail. Failure of integration efforts has a disproportionately negative effect upon the wider peace process.

The Economic Imperative

Integration is often viewed by individual combatants primarily through an economic or livelihood perspective. In cases where integration could not provide a security guarantee, it was successful by achieving an economic objective.

Military Integration within a Wider Approach

Integration should be placed within a larger state building plan, incorporating a National Defence Strategy that defines the role and structure of the military. The military should be conceived within a sustainable state revenue projection.

Inclusive Structures

The degree of success achieved within any given context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible.

Inclusive integration processes that are planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict are more likely to be successful.

Police Reform and military integration

Police forces, and other uniformed services, can often be misused as a political safety-valve for ex-combatants not required or selected by the integration process to join the military.

A comprehensive integration process should include planning for the individual selection, education and training of personnel for the police, as a separate process to the military.

Military Integration and civilian reintegration

A military integration process should be conceived and planned with a specific civilian reintegration component, for those individuals not selected for military service.

The **civilian reintegration** programmes should be planned and managed by the same body responsible for military integration.

The Role of International Actors

International assistance can greatly enhance the prospects for successfully achieving integration processes. The most commonly witnessed assistance incorporates flexible 'process' support, and technical military training.

International actors can play vital arbitration roles, as well as technical roles, if invited to do so by both parties to the integration process; the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in South Africa being the exemplary case.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides a synthesis of key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues relating to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war. As well as drawing upon existing studies the paper synthesises themes by examining the data from eight primary and fifteen secondary case studies drawn from various sources.

This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as help-desk support offered to HMG to inform its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration. In particular examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military forces (police, armed police, intelligence, etc), and creation of new security structures (industrial security forces, border police, etc) into which ex-combatants are then integrated

The primary sources of information utilised consist of the following:

- Burgess, S.F. 2008. *'Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict'*, African Security.
- Glassmyer, K. and Sambanis, M. 2008. *'Rebel Military Integration and Civil War Termination'*, Journal of Peace Research.
- Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. 2006. *'From anarchy to security: Comparing theoretical approaches to the process of disarmament following civil war'*, Contemporary Security Policy.
- Hoddie, M. and Hartzell, C. 2003. *'Arrangements Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing'*, Journal of Peace Research.
- Licklider, R. 2009. *'New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil War'*, Unpublished, Rutgers University.

Of particular importance were the online quantitative data sets related to the Hartzell & Hoddie (2006) and Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008) papers. This data and information gathered from other sources, which are detailed in the bibliography, has been collated and summarised in the primary and secondary case studies (annexes A and B), and form the data upon which the analysis within this paper is based.

The paper is structured in six parts: (1) the Executive Summary; (2) an introduction; (3) an outline of approaches to military integration; (4) thematic issues relating to military integration; (5) conclusions and lessons identified; and (6) three annexes covering primary case studies, secondary case studies, and the bibliography.

A key conclusion of the Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008) study is that military integration does not lead to peace. The study finds that peace initiatives are more likely to fail where there was an attempt at military

integration, but suggests that this is because incomplete, poorly structured military integration within peace agreements increases the risks of the failure of the wider peace process. Successfully implementing integration aspects of peace agreements is positively associated with peace, but the study cautions that the evidence is suggestive and not conclusive.

The Mozambican case is instructive as a fully implemented integration process Mozambique's peace settlement required government troops and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) forces to integrate in order to form a new national army. Because RENAMO delayed sending students for officer training for the new joint army, demobilisation of both the RENAMO and government troops was not completed until nearly two years after the peace agreement was signed. Ultimately, however, demobilisation by both groups proved so successful that in 1995 President Joaquim Chissano announced that conscription would be necessary in order to get the new, integrated Mozambique Democratic Armed Forces up to full strength.

Partial implementation is also a common outcome of integration endeavours, as the two accords intended to end the civil war in Angola highlight. The Bicesse Accords, signed in 1991, called for the creation of a new national army, totalling 40,000 men, which was to be evenly divided between government and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) troops. Although UNITA did send some of its troops to assembly points to be disarmed and demobilised, tens of thousands of guerrillas and their arms were concealed in remote areas. By the time elections were held in September 1992, only 45 per cent of government troops had been demobilised and only 24 per cent of the forces assembled by UNITA had given up their weapons. The subsequent Lusaka Protocol, signed in 1994, also called for the creation of a unified national army, this time with a strength of approximately 90,000 troops. Although the integration process was deemed to have concluded in 1998, with UNITA claiming to have fully completed the demobilisation process, it was reported that UNITA still had 25–30,000 fully equipped and mobilised troops.

Cases of failed military integration, often leading to or constituting an element of a wider failure of the peace process, are also a common theme within the literature. The Cambodian peace settlement provides a case of failed implementation of military measures. The Paris Agreement, signed in 1991, called for the re-groupment, cantonment, and disarmament of at least 70 per cent of the forces of each of the four warring factions – the State of Cambodia, the faction headed by Son Sann, the Royalist faction led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and the Khmer Rouge – with the remaining 30 per cent to be incorporated into a new national army. Although the State of Cambodia government and the two non-communist factions cooperated to varying extents in this operation, the Khmer Rouge refused to regroup and disarm its forces (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003).

2. APPROACHES TO MILITARY INTEGRATION

There are as many different approaches to military integration as there are contexts in which it has been attempted. Judging success within any given context requires a detailed understanding of the requirements of a given conflict resolution process. No universal concept or approach to military integration exists, although Licklider (2008) suggests that *“Integration means that individuals are brought into the new military in positions similar to the ones they occupied in prior organisations which were in combat with their own.”*

Two distinct contexts, military defeat and political defeat (or stalemate) can be identified. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia are examples of political defeat, whereby undefeated militaries were required to merge into a single entity. Within the context of political defeat or stalemate the approach that has achieved most recognisable success is defined as the ‘1+1=3’ approach. This highlights the requirement for two separate single military structures and cultures to merge. Success is achieved when no single structure or culture dominates the merged force; instead, a ‘third force’ results from the integration process: hence the 1+1=3 formula. The second scenario, where one group is militarily defeated or a national military incorporates a much smaller regional secessionist military group, often results in the smaller (or defeated) force being subsumed in the existing structures and culture of the national military.

The case of Moro integration within the Filipino military highlights the problems of cultural assimilation and the need to create new programmes and approaches as problems arise. The South African, Zimbabwean and Namibian case studies highlight the advantages of utilising the existing military structures and personnel of a politically defeated military within the integration process. In South Africa the process included programmes to upgrade the capacity of ANC/MK personnel through education and staff training so that they could assume senior ranks within the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

Bosnia saw a phased approach that resulted from significant international support. The first step was to bring the Croat and Bosniak forces together. This process went fairly smoothly. The major instrument was a \$250 million Train and Equip programme, developed by the United States and funded by the US, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Brunei, the aim of which was to establish military parity between the Federation Army and the Republik Serbska forces. In return, the United States required that the Bosnian and Croatian forces be integrated at the upper levels, although initially not at the lower levels. The programme involved substantial amounts of equipment and training and joint planning at high levels. Subsequent phases of planning called for integration to take place at the lower levels. There were to be three regiments, one each

made up of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and each consisting of three battalions. However, the regiments would not be operational units¹.

The approach adopted in Burundi consisted of demobilising forces, the creation of a constitution for the National Defence Force, and wider security sector reform. The Burundian government signed agreements with the different non-state forces stipulating that they would be brought in, jointly disarmed, and then integrated into what would be a transformed army and police force. The process was hindered by the government's delay in producing a budget and financing the integration process. Although the army was supposed to be working with the rebels to create new security forces, it was still deployed fighting the National Liberation Front (FLN). Eventually, the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process moved forward.

The approach in the DR Congo required the immediate mixing of different ethnic groups, which comprised the forces, with little additional training for senior positions. This process was not as successful as it could have been for a number of reasons. Rank alignment in terms of officer ranks was based on seniority within militia groups. Re-training and training did not take into consideration issues such as human rights, the rule of law and civil oversight. Whilst both unit and single combatant integration took place, soldiers moved towards leaders and brigades of their own ethnicity, thus polarising the new National Military (FARDC). One consequence of this was that soldiers were reluctant to accept postings in regions where their ethnic group was not seen to be in charge. Old rivalries from the civil war remain and have led to an escalation in tensions between different brigades. Officers, too, were not immune from this ethnic rivalry. Some militia leaders who were made senior ranking officers within the army (on account of their previous militia seniority) have simply built a personal support base of soldiers within the FARDC.

In Namibia the integration process faced language barriers, hostility and distrust between former enemies, and lack of infrastructure. BMATTs in Namibia drew on lessons learned in Zimbabwe, concentrating advice and training at a more senior level and "training the trainers". The training course included both South African and Soviet-bloc techniques that had been employed by ex-SWATF and ex-PLAN members respectively. However, British Army methods were given precedence, which helped to integrate the NDF and foster a sense of Namibian identity. The Namibian experience is an instructive case of the '1+1=3' process, whereby two culturally diverse militaries are combined into a third force, with external assistance. Neither of the two militaries' structures or cultures gained ascendancy; instead, the process resulted in a third force and new military culture.

¹ Regiments are purely ceremonial organisations and unlike brigades have no operational, training or administrative roles. Brigades are the 'business organisations'. A regimental system embodies the historical military lineage of the component from which it is descended. It reflects symbols and accomplishments with which soldiers identify, and maintains the regimental heritage.

The South African approach entailed training and education of ex-rebels. Initially, ex-SADF officers continued to occupy senior command and staff positions within the new SANDF, especially while ex-ANC/MK officers were involved in extensive training programmes. By 1998, there were shifts in the balance of power in the SANDF, and the integration process began in earnest. After a failed power play by General Meiring, he and other ex-SADF officers were compelled to retire from the SANDF, which opened the door to integration in the higher ranks. A cohort of ex-ANC/MK officers who had completed their compulsory training were promoted into senior command and staff positions.

The integration process in Zimbabwe welcomed all wishing to launch military careers into the Zimbabwe National Army. The plan was to fully train between 30,000 and 35,000 troops by the end of 1980 and ultimately reach a total of 45,000, which represented a compromise between a larger ideal strength of more than 60,000 and the need to contain costs. From ZANLA and ZIPRA, 9,500 members were expected to join the army. The remaining 23,000 guerrillas were to become reservists. Rather than relying on former Rhodesian Army officers, the new Zimbabwe government called on the United Kingdom to take a leading role in training the ZNA and for financial assistance. In June 1980, the British government responded by sending BMATT to assist in creating and integrating the Zimbabwe National Army. At BMATT's request, former ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders provided 300 leaders and 400 rank-and-file for each of the 15 planned battalions. BMATT trained senior officers, middle-ranking officers, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers. After six weeks of basic infantry training, segments were combined before deployment to remote areas. By July 1980, battalions were being formed at the rate of two per month. However, plans to divert a large number of demobilised guerrillas to development work failed, and they, as well, had to be integrated into the ZNA, further accelerating the formation of battalions.

The Philippines' military integration in Mindanao adopted a two-track approach, for police and military forces. The settlement, signed in September 1996, called for the integration of some 7,500 members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) military wing into the national army and security forces and the establishment of a regional security force in Mindanao. Implementation of the measures proceeded apace, with at least 6,750 MNLF members integrated into special and auxiliary units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) four years after the settlement was signed.

The Government of the Philippines' order in October 1997 to integrate over 4000 members of the MNLF into the AFP and the PNP took place without disarming the combatants. Retrospectively, a number of incentives were offered, such as modest cash allowances, but this made little difference to the proliferation of weapons. The integration process

into the AFP took three years, whilst integration into the PNP took five years. The integration began with processing followed by individual training and then on-the-job training and deployment. The training for integration into the AFP was carried out separately from the original AFP forces. Once completed, combatants would merge into existing AFP units. A quota system was set up for different ranks, with quotas for officers, soldiers and auxiliaries being filled by selection and testing.

With MNLF combatants leaving a highly politicised and religious movement, there were initial problems between the 'integreees' and their new colleagues. The new recruits felt they were misunderstood, and were not used to the rigid, hierarchical structures of the AFP and PNP as their movement emphasised equality between trainer and teacher. An 'internalisation' programme was then established for ex-combatants, which included counselling to counter their previous political beliefs and a psycho-cultural programme to harmonise the relationships between the ex-combatants and their new colleagues.

Lesson Identified: In contexts of political defeat or stalemate, where neither military force achieved a decisive victory, a 1+1=3 formula might usefully be applied. This indicates that two separate forces integrating should result in a new third force. Neither of the existing militaries structures, personnel or cultures should dominate the new force.

3. THEMATIC ISSUES

3.1 Political Solution

Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) highlight how military integration is often used in conjunction with political power-sharing agreements. Power-sharing is understood within the context of a wider peace agreement, and entails any formal arrangement for the distribution of political positions (cabinet posts, legislative seats, etc.), as well as sharp departures from previously exclusionary systems if the new system formally includes minority groups and allows groups associated with the non-state militias to participate in elections where previously this was not allowed. A common conclusion, supported by the case studies, argues that pursuing integration outside of the context of a political settlement is unlikely to work and that integration should be promoted as a peacekeeping strategy only as a part of a multi-dimensional approach to peacebuilding.

Some cases illustrate evidence on the ways in which power-sharing might work together with military integration. In some peacebuilding success stories, the non-state military transformed itself into a political party and engaged in nonviolent political competition, while also being integrated into the military or police (El Salvador, Mozambique, Djibouti). But, in other cases, political competition led to more instability (Angola, Rwanda, Chad). Power-sharing and military integration seemed to be mutually reinforcing in several cases, as in Tajikistan and Uganda, where commanding officers from both sides were heavily involved in the design of the peace process. In Mali, high-ranking Tuareg officers were integrated into the high command of the army and were also appointed to key non-military government positions. In cases like Bangladesh or Papua New Guinea, where power-sharing amounted to increased regional autonomy for the non-state militaries, there should be less of a need for integration if the autonomous regions are given the authority to self-police. In most of the cases that were reviewed, military integration preceded and supported political reforms, including power-sharing.

Lesson Identified: The political solution to ending the conflict is the most pressing contextual factor in which the integration will be implemented. The integration process will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.

3.2 Military integration as 'credible signs of intent'

Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) develop a theory to explain why peace settlement implementation is important for building an enduring peace in states emerging from violent civil conflict. By implementing the provisions of an agreement it is suggested leaders of the compromising groups are unambiguously signalling their genuine commitment to peace. These signals are understood to be credible because they are associated with heavy costs to the implementing parties in terms of both an immediate loss of political power vis-à-vis their competitors in the war and the likely

loss of support among the more militant members of their own groups. It is argued that it is the willingness to endure these costs in an effort to demonstrate a preference for stability that allows former antagonists to surmount security concerns and move toward a self-sustaining peace.

This approach to examining the issues surrounding military integration highlights that the complete implementation of the military integration provisions of settlements significantly improves the prospects for maintaining peace, a finding particularly highlighted within the Hoddie & Hartzell study. They suggest that this proves to be the case because of the important and credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies that are made through the process of implementation of military integration provisions. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups

Prior to the signing of a settlement, an army provides the greatest degree of security for a group as well as the most obvious source of leverage vis-à-vis adversaries. In most cases, the implementation of a military integration arrangement requires that organisations and individuals forgo the capacity to protect their own interests and instead entrust their security to the newly established institutions of the post-war state. Therefore, intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge around this issue, especially if the implementation of those provisions limits a group's capacity to provide for its own security.

Glassmyer & Sambanis' (2008) examination of case studies suggests that overcoming mistrust is very difficult and that constant reassurance is needed throughout a peace process. Military integration can help to build trust, but integration must be deep and well structured for this to happen. A good example is the case of Tajikistan, where the armies were integrated, unit-by-unit, into the national army; there was no within-unit integration; and planning for integration involved the military command from both sides, which helped address the mistrust that had been built up during the war.

However, if poorly structured or incomplete, these studies suggest military integration is associated with increased risk of peace failure. Delays create suspicion, and implementation delays can cause a return to violence. But, more frequently, implementation delays are a symptom of a failing peace process rather than a cause of it. In Sierra Leone, the military integration specified under the Abidjan agreement of 1996 was never implemented, but the ceasefire leading up to Abidjan had broken down soon after signing and before substantive implementation was initiated. Angola in 1994 is another example. Military integration was an integral part of the peace process, with a plan to create a new national army split evenly between non-state and government troops. With an inflow of foreign

assistance and 7,000 UN peacekeepers, the process could move fast, but at least 15,000 of UNITA's troops were never demobilised, and this undermined the entire demobilisation process in December 1995. The rebel leader, Savimbi, stalled at each turn of the peace process, and, by mid-1997 only a small percentage of the rebels had been integrated. Fighting recommenced in 1998. UNITA demonstrated a general lack of commitment to the peace, and this was not due to the failure of military integration.

The cases reviewed, and the consensus of the studies, show that there was not a clear causal chain: sometimes failure to implement military integration can lead to peace failure, but, at other times, it is a general deterioration of the peacebuilding environment that can explain military integration failure.

Lesson Identified: An integration process requires parties to a conflict, and individuals engaged in the conflict, to forgo the instruments that are seen to provide for their security. Therefore intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge.

Lesson Identified: Progress on military integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation. Military integration constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups.

3.3 Design and Implementation

Glassmyer & Sambanis' (2008) quantitative analysis study suggests that military integration agreements usually do not work, but they suggest it is unclear as to exactly why. A look at the cases suggests some possible explanations. One thing that becomes immediately clear is that military integration is a messy process, as only in a few cases (Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda) were there detailed guidelines on how many government and non-state combatants to integrate into a new national army, and how. Often military integration amounts to the government simply allowing or encouraging the non-state forces to join the national army. In some cases (e.g. South Africa, Uganda in 1992), the government could absorb as many non-state combatants as were willing and able to join, but in other cases the army was downsized, and this created limits on the scope of military integration.

Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008) found that, consistent with the statistical evidence and support by the case studies, there was evidence that poorly structured and incomplete integration agreements are associated with peacebuilding failure. In Cambodia, restructuring the military took the

form of 'dualisation' rather than integration. An awkward government coalition emerged between Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen (leader of the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian People's Party). The two leaders each had their own bureaucracy, police, ministries and military. Hun Sen's power grew stronger and in 1997 he used security units that were under his control to depose his governing partner. All but one of the case studies examined, whereby military integration was not implemented, coincided with a return to war. The cases also clearly show that there is wide variation in the scope and design of military integration, and this implies that not all contexts adopted the same approach or received the same support nationally, or internationally.

Burgess (2008) concludes that one of the most significant factors in the success or failure of an military integration is the management of the process. It is suggested that if the process of demobilisation and integration of militias is skillfully managed, then the reconstitution of security forces is more likely to succeed. Burgess finds that five criteria must be met in order for this to be achieved. First, the principles, values, and objectives of the military integration must be reflected in comprehensive peace settlements. Second, there must be a strategy and resources for the demobilisation of combatants. Third, major parties must have the political will to ensure that the rank-and-file comply with leadership directives. Fourth, all parties must be included in a flexible and adaptable process. Fifth, a realistic assessment of the capacity of the state and security forces to perform complex tasks associated with the process of military integration must be undertaken.

Lesson Identified: Poorly conceived and implemented military integration processes are more likely to fail. Failure of military integration has a disproportionately negative effect upon the wider peace process.

3.4 The Economic Imperative

Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) explore the relationship between military integration serving a primarily security objective and military integration serving an economic objective. Their discussions are based upon the premise that the military integration security guarantees are credible. military integration cannot offer credible security guarantees if there are severe imbalances in the numbers of non-state combatants and government soldiers that are integrated into a new national army, since large power asymmetries imply that the stronger side can easily unilaterally defect from the agreements. If the cases show evidence that military integration is used despite large power asymmetries, then this would be evidence more consistent with the economic mechanism than the security mechanism.

The case studies suggest that military integration rarely results in the integration of equal numbers of non-state ex-combatants and government

soldiers, though in some cases the army is expanded substantially and absorbs many s. In Uganda, Museveni's NRA expanded from 15,000 in the late 1980s to over 100,000 by 1992, as it absorbed fighters from other groups. In many other cases, non-state military forces agreed to integrate even when the government forces would far out-number them, as in South Africa, where the former government army constituted nearly 80 per cent of the new army.

Cases of military integration after military victory also do not fit the security mechanism. In Nigeria, after the Biafran war (1967–70), Biafran rebels were reintegrated into the army from which they had broken away to start their rebellion. Their military defeat clearly implied that integration would not provide them with a security guarantee, and it could only be seen as a political or economic strategy by the government to foster stability by restoring those soldiers to their jobs. After military mutinies in the Central African Republic, rebel leader Lt. Parfait Mbaye insisted that his men be permitted to return to barracks rather than be demobilised. The 200 defeated mutineers did not pose a significant security threat to the government, so reintegrating them in the army was not intended to resolve a security dilemma, but was, rather, a low-cost way to decrease the rebels' incentives for continued fighting.

Glassmyer and Sambanis conclude that in most cases that were reviewed, economic incentives seem to drive the process. This was evident even in cases where the military was carefully balanced between government and non-state soldiers, as in Mozambique. Likewise, the 1999 peace accord in Congo-Brazzaville describes the parties' concerns over 'the reconstitution of [their] careers' through reintegration into the military. In Angola, Jonas Savimbi highlighted the importance of economic concerns, saying that warfare had become the rebels' 'raison d'être': these men had no homes and families, let alone jobs, to which they could return. The critical economic function of military integration can explain why it is often pursued even when it cannot offer security guarantees.

Lesson Identified: Military integration is often viewed by individual combatants primarily through an economic or livelihood perspective. In cases where military integration could not provide a security guarantee, it was successful by achieving an economic objective.

3.5 Military integration within a wider approach

Many of the case studies examined highlight a recurrent factor for successful military integration: the requirement to place the integration process within a wider statebuilding plan, and view it through a peacebuilding perspective. This can include the concurrent development of a National Security Strategy (NSS), White Paper on Defence and maintaining a 'system wide focus' that incorporates the Police, Judiciary, Air Force and Navy (if applicable), border guards and civilian oversight

mechanisms. If the context dictates that in the short term the integration requires an increase in the size of the defence sector, a longer-term perspective and concrete plan should be developed that ensures the defence sector is manageable and affordable within the capacities of the state, and this perspective should be reached through an inclusive process.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 ended the Bosnian civil wars. Dayton established a complex political system with a weak central government and three separate “entities”, each of which had its own defence ministry and army. Two of these were theoretically linked but in fact were militarily separate. The Accords did not specify a united national army and did not establish a state-level ministry of defence; instead they established a weak Standing Committee on Military Matters. The three groups were able to successfully continue their separate military forces for several years.

The Office of the High Representative, the international institution charged with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, formed the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) and charged it to recommend military reforms which would allow Bosnia to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. The committee consisted of two members from the central Bosnian government and each of the three population groups with single members from the Office of the High Representative, NATO, and OSCE as well as the commander of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The DRC drafted a law that called for a Bosnian ministry of defence to take control of forces from the entities, and establish a single command structure and a single budget; however, the forces themselves would remain separate.

The experience of South Africa’s approach to undertaking military integration within a wider approach represents the exemplary case study. The 1994 transition placed ANC leaders into positions of power in the revamped Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the newly created Defence Secretariat provided civilian control over the military. The Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence, respectively Joe Modise and Ronnie Kasrils, resisted attempts by the chief of SANDF, General Georg Meiring, to control how the restructuring of the SANDF and national defence would proceed. Also, ex-ANC/MK and progressive ex-SADF officers in the MoD and the policy and planning and finance divisions of the Defence Secretariat succeeded in managing the Defence White Paper and Defence Review processes.

The 1996 White Paper on National Defence and the comprehensive Defence Review provided a blueprint for restructuring and integrating the military and the defence establishment as well as for expanding the peace dividend. From 1994 to 1998, personnel from ANC/MK and other non-SADF militias were absorbed into the former SADF, but there was little integration and transformation. Ex-SADF officers continued to occupy senior command and staff positions within the new SANDF, especially

while ex-ANC/MK officers and others were involved in extensive training programmes. By 1998, there were shifts in the balance of power in the SANDF, and the integration process began in earnest. Ex-ANC/MK officers who had had their compulsory training were promoted into senior command and staff positions.

Lesson Identified: Military integration **should be placed within a larger statebuilding plan, incorporating a National Defence Strategy that informs the role and structure of the military. The military should be conceived within a sustainable state revenue projection.**

3.6 Inclusive Structures

The degree of success achieved within any single context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible for military integration. Burgess (2008) highlighted that one of the most significant factors in the success or failure of military integration was the management of the process. This was significantly enhanced if all parties were included in a flexible and adoptable process. Such inclusion requires that all parties are represented in decision-making structures and that such structures were imbued with genuine decision-making power. It has also been shown to contribute to success if one single body retains responsibility for the plethora of activities, processes and programmes that constitute a comprehensive process; this includes civilian integration within any DDR measures.

In both the South African and Zimbabwean success stories, inclusive structures were established. In South Africa a Sub-Council on Defence was established to maintain oversight over the armed forces as the SANDF was created in time for the handover of power in April–May 1994. Planning and staff responsibility for the management of the planning process was delegated to a Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC). Working groups dealt with matters of personnel, intelligence and operations, as well as logistics and finances, and other groups dealt with issues involving the four services. The integration process was controlled by the SADF and the ANC/MK. The ANC/MK succeeded in reaching compromise agreements with the SADF on the ranking and placement of non-SADF officers and on the management and oversight of the transformation and integration process during the post-election period.

In Zimbabwe after the new government, headed by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF, took power in March 1980, a Joint Military High Command (JHC) was established to preside over “Operation Merger”, the military integration process. Lt. Gen. Walls was commander, aided by senior commanders from the former Rhodesian Army and Air Force, ZANLA and ZIPRA. The command structures of the militias were treated as equals, to facilitate integration into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

Lesson Identified: The degree of success achieved within any given context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible.

Lesson Identified: Inclusive integration processes that are planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict, are more likely to be successful.

3.7 Police Reform and military integration

The case studies highlight the requirement within any military integration process to pay equal attention to the police force. At the conclusion of internal conflicts the national police are often viewed as an instrument of repression of the state, as was the case in many southern African examples. The ability to transfer individuals from a military organisation to a police force is not as straightforward as military integration. The skills and education and professional aptitudes required for effective policing are radically different from those favoured within militaries. A comprehensive military integration process should therefore include planning for the individual selection, education and training of personnel for the police.

A common theme in the case studies is the use of the police, as a uniformed service, as a political safety valve for ex-combatants not required or selected by the integration process to join the military. In Mozambique a seemingly deliberate policy of the government was to bolster the police force with loyalists, hence creating a political police force. In Namibia the failure of the civilian reintegration process created pressure on the government from 'ex-liberation fighters' which it tried to deal with by creating an auxiliary police force (SFF). This auxiliary force is widely viewed as a political force outside of the control of the legitimate state structures.

The police integration process in Burundi was carried out with some difficulty due to poor logistics and the training and reorientation of new elements. The necessity of training newcomers - former guerrillas or ex-government soldiers - for police work posed serious problems. In response, the government appealed to the international community for assistance in police training. By 2007, the integration process had made considerable progress, as evidenced by Burundi's pledge of 1,800 personnel from the integrated security forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia.

In 1994, a CIVPOL mission deployed to Mozambique to observe policing activities during the transition and helped to reassure RENAMO. During the demobilisation and disarmament processes, CIVPOL officers found that government military troops and equipment were being transferred to the police, especially to the presidential guard. The CIVPOL confirmed that the FRELIMO Government appeared to be preparing a police force that was

loyal to the party. The integration process in Mozambique thus faced problems that included low standards of education and training, a lack of objective criteria in the selection of police candidates, a predisposition among police officers to take bribes, and a lack of resources. The police grew from an estimated 18,000 in 1994 to more than 21,000 in 1998. A UNDP mission in the late 1990s helped to assess and upgrade the police. As a consequence of the assessment and upgrade, more than 300 officers were expelled, corruption was curbed, and crime-fighting potential was increased.

In Namibia the SWAPO government consolidated its hold on its core supporters and the state security apparatus by employing ex-combatants in public service, especially uniformed services. The Special Field Force (SFF) branch of the Namibian Police (Nampol) most clearly exemplifies the strategic and volatile position of the ex-combatants. Since the late 1990s it has incorporated thousands of ex-combatants and now outnumbers the Namibian Police personnel by nearly three to one. The SFF mainly patrols the borders but also supplements other Namibian Police branches elsewhere. It is widely seen as a SWAPO, even presidential, force, while government officials maintain it is a neutral part of the police. The role and mode of operation of SFF has been continually controversial. The media and human rights organisations regularly report on the heavy-handed measures by the SFF against civilians: The SFF has a reputation for casual beating of suspected offenders; the SFF has become mandated to use violence beyond official rules and procedures; the SFF operates in the territorial, social and political margins of the state.

In apartheid era South Africa the South African Police had a notorious reputation for controlling and suppressing the black population and for widespread human rights abuses. Consequently, the Interim Constitution of April 1994 provided for the creation of a new and unified police force, the South African Police Service (SAPS). The new service inherited more than 140,000 personnel from the SAP and began the process of transformation into a representative and effective crime-fighting and public protection force. The door was opened to ANC/MK security personnel and others to join, be trained, and rise through the ranks to higher positions in the SAPS. The process was guided by a White Paper, the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme and a new national police commissioner. While progress in building an effective national police force was slow and painstaking, the new police force eventually became a positive force for peacebuilding, justice and stability.

Lesson Identified: Police forces, and other uniformed services, can often be misused as a political safety-valve for ex-combatants not required or selected by the integration process to join the military.

Lesson Identified: A comprehensive military integration process should include planning for the individual selection, education and

training of personnel for the police, as a separate process to the military.

3.8 Military integration and Civilian Reintegration

As highlighted previously, there exists a strong economic incentive for individuals to take part in an military integration process, and gain employment in a reconstituted military. With such a link established the military integration process should not be conceived or planned separately to any civilian reintegration processes, but the two should form part of a wider integrated process of transition. In Mozambique a fairly generous civilian reintegration programme made it difficult to staff the new, integrated national army. Intended to be 30,000 strong, drawn equally from FRELIMO and RENAMO, the actual post-war integrated Mozambican army was less than half that size. The civilian reintegration programme ended up with 20,000 more participants than anticipated.

Mali's successful peace process similarly offered both civilian and military integration opportunities. While fewer than 2,000 ex-combatants ended up integrating into the military, more than 9,000 participated in civilian reintegration, which involved a cash payment and either a small monthly payment or enrolment in a UNDP credit programme, depending on whether they had turned in their weapon, plus vocational training and educational scholarships. Of those who took the civilian reintegration option, about one-third opted for the plan that paid more generous benefits yet required turning in a weapon, while 6,000 took the less lucrative plan that did not require handing over a weapon.

Like the programme in Mozambique, Mali's civilian reintegration programme reduced the demand for military integration and offered tangible economic benefits to keep the peace. Several of the cases that were reviewed suggest that civilian reintegration and military integration are substitutable, and civilian reintegration is often used to accommodate an 'excess supply' of ex-combatants. In Angola's most recent peace process, UNITA combatants who had been formerly integrated into the government army and demobilised were paid five months of back pay, and given an integration allowance and a reintegration kit of household and farming items. Likewise, in Cambodia in 1998 and Iraq in 1972, former non-state combatants who could not be integrated in the national army were provided with cash payments. This also happened informally in Namibia, where most of the 21,000 or so demobilised Namibian soldiers from SWATF (the largest Namibian force to fight for the South African side) continued to take their pay well after the peace process had concluded.

While DDR is viewed as an essentially civilian project and army reform as a military initiative there is nevertheless a fundamental link between the successes of both. This inherent link is recognised in the DRC, in the national documents and operational plans governing the DDR and Army

Reform programmes, which set out a “*tronc commun*”, or combined core, for the two programmes. The process under the “*tronc commun*” requires all fighters, whether they are to enter the DDR programme or be recruited into the new army, to follow identical procedures, which involve awareness-raising, disarmament, identification and orientation. On 12 November 2004 a law regulating and organising the unified army (FARDC) came into force. Article 45 of the *Loi portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées*, (Law on the General Organisation of Defence and the Armed Forces), recognised the key national military entities to take part in the process of integration into the FARDC.

Namibia is an illustrative example of the military integration being a success whilst the civilian reintegration was a failure. Neither the United Nations nor the new government planned any reinsertion or reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. After independence, many former soldiers of both sides failed to reintegrate economically. In response to protests from disaffected veterans, the government hastily designed a number of ad hoc activities. Consequently, the Namibian demobilisation and reintegration programme resembles a patchwork of well-intended programme responses rather than a strategic government policy and planned programme response.

With no coherent targeting mechanism in place and uneven registration to link ex-combatants to the benefits safety net, targeting leakages were numerous and substantial at all stages of the process. The objective of this policy was to address the basic needs of the ex-combatants. The Ministry of Defence estimated that as many as 40 per cent of eligible ex-combatants did not benefit from severance pay. The Development Brigade (DB), established in 1991 to address the needs after repatriation of the many ex-combatants who had been unable to secure employment, also proved unsuccessful, leading eventually to the establishment of the SFF, as discussed above.

Lesson Identified: Military integration process should be conceived and planned with a specific civilian integration component, for those individuals not selected for military service.

Lesson Identified: The civilian integration programmes should be planned and managed by the same body responsible for military integration.

3.9 The Role of International Actors

Glassmyer & Sambanis (2008) suggest that the case evidence is consistent with an argument that impartial peacekeeping can help improve military integration by reducing mutual suspicion during implementation. External involvement takes many forms. In Mali, the UNDP managed demobilisation and established the Trust Fund for North Mali. In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, third parties helped the

transition away from white rule by integrating non-whites into the military. In Tajikistan, the UN, together with the Collective Peace-keeping Forces in Tajikistan (CIS/PKF), accompanied rebel units from their posts in Afghanistan to the assembly areas where they would await demobilisation.

Burgess (2008) argues that many states that have suffered internal conflict have been considerably weakened; some have collapsed. In order to succeed in implementing military integration, most weak and failing states require substantial external involvement, such as extended peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts by the United Nations. In order to advance the integration process, external involvement and assistance in the form of training have proved to be essential in helping to convert militias into security forces and in training integrated militaries and police forces. Local capacity for such training is limited. *“Therefore, external involvement and assistance is necessary because external trainers possess the expertise in military and police operations and tactics that can lead to the professionalisation of the integrated security forces and enhance esprit de corps”* (Burgess, 2008).

In the DRC the army reform plan drawn up by the Ministry of Defence enabled the creation of 16 military integration and retraining centres. These centres were selected on the basis of their capacity to accommodate up to 4,000 soldiers. Unlike the DDR programme, the army reform programme suffered from lukewarm support from the international community, especially by the international financial institutions. In response, the Congolese government turned to bilateral cooperation to fund the programme and ensure technical support. In an experimental initiative, the government integrated and trained the 1st Brigade with Belgian support in March 2004 at Kisangani. This brigade was deployed in Ituri in late 2004 where security needs were greatest and where the limited deployment of MONUC forces had failed to restore security. The 2nd Brigade was integrated and trained at Kitona with the cooperation of Angola in March April 2005, and the 3rd Brigade was trained at Kamina with support from South Africa and Belgium in May-June 2005. In addition, during 2005 and in accordance with the emergency plan, and with technical and logistical support from Belgium and MONUC, the Congolese government integrated three other brigades.

In Zimbabwe the Commonwealth sent monitors to oversee the ceasefire, and requested that ex-Rhodesian Army officers take charge of the military training of ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas for integration into the structure of the old Rhodesian Army. At BMATT's request, former ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders provided 300 leaders and 400 rank-and-file for each of the 15 planned battalions. The BMATT trained senior officers, middle-ranking officers, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers. After six weeks of basic infantry training, segments were combined before deployment to remote areas. By July 1980, battalions were being formed at the rate of two per month. However, plans to divert a large number of demobilised guerrillas to development work failed, and they, as well, had to be

integrated into the ZNA, further accelerating the formation of battalions. In South Africa, as in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the British armed forces were invited, this time as arbitrators overseeing the creation of the SANDF and the integration process. The planning process brought warring militias together and created the basis for a common institutional culture.

Lesson Identified: International assistance can greatly enhance the prospects for successfully achieving military integration processes. The most commonly witnessed assistance incorporates flexible 'process' support, and technical military training.

Lesson Identified: International actors can play vital arbitration roles, as well as technical roles, if invited to do so by both parties to the integration process; the BMATT in South Africa being the exemplary case.

4. CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS IDENTIFIED.

The paper has highlighted the complex and diverse nature of military integration. There exist as many approaches and solutions as there are contexts in which it has been attempted. An examination of the available case study material has, however, provided some consistent themes that have been highlighted throughout the paper as lessons identified.

An overarching and consistent theme throughout all case studies examined is the requirement, with military integration endeavours, to view the process as the outcome. Military integration is an element of wider post conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and as such the outcome is rarely predictable. An effective and sustainable solution from one context cannot be assumed to represent a template solution for another context. Support to the process of decision-making and bodies established to implement decisions has been seen to be an effective strategy for external assistance.

1. Lesson Identified: In contexts of political defeat or stalemate, where neither military force achieved a decisive victory, a 1+1=3 formula could usefully be applied. This indicates that two separate forces integrating should result in a new third force. Neither of the existing military structures, personnel or cultures should dominate the new force.
2. Lesson Identified: The political solution to ending the conflict is the most pressing contextual factor in which the military integration will be implemented. The integration process will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.
3. Lesson Identified: A military integration process requires parties to a conflict, and individuals engaged in the conflict, to forgo the instruments that are seen to provide for their security. Therefore intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge around the military integration issue.
4. Lesson Identified: Progress on military integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation. Military integration constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups.
5. Lesson Identified: Poorly conceived and implemented military integration processes are more likely to fail. Failure of military integration has a disproportionately negative effect upon the wider peace process.

6. Lesson Identified: Military integration is often viewed by individual combatants primarily through an economic or livelihood perspective. In cases where military integration could not provide a security guarantee, it was successful by achieving an economic objective.
7. Lesson Identified: Military integration should be placed within a larger statebuilding plan, incorporating a National Defence Strategy that informs the role and structure of the military. The military should be conceived within a sustainable state revenue projection.
8. Lesson Identified: The degree of success achieved within any given context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible for military integration.
9. Lesson Identified: Inclusive military integration processes that are planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict are more likely to be successful.
10. Lesson Identified: Police forces, and other uniformed services, can often be misused as a political safety valve for ex-combatants not required or selected by the military integration process to join the military.
11. Lesson Identified: A comprehensive military integration process should include planning for the individual selection, education and training of personnel for the police, as a separate process to the military.
12. Lesson Identified: military integration process should be conceived and planned with a specific civilian reintegration component, for those individuals not selected for military service.
13. Lesson Identified: The civilian reintegration programmes should be planned and managed by the same body responsible for military integration.
14. Lesson Identified: International assistance can greatly enhance the prospects for successfully achieving military integration processes. The most commonly witnessed assistance incorporates flexible 'process' support, and technical military training.
15. Lesson Identified: International actors can play vital arbitration roles, as well as technical roles, if invited to do so by both parties to the military integration; the BMATT in South Africa being the exemplary case.

ANNEX A: PRIMARY CASE STUDIES

Bosnia – Burundi – DRC – Mozambique – Namibia – South Africa – Zimbabwe – The Philippines

1. Bosnia:

The Dayton Accords of 1995 ended the Bosnian civil wars. Dayton established a complex political system with a weak central government and three separate “entities”, each of which had its own defence ministry and army. Two of these were theoretically linked but in fact were militarily separate. The Accords did not specify a united national army and did not establish a state-level ministry of defence; instead they established a weak Standing Committee on Military Matters. The three groups were able to successfully continue their separate military forces for several years.

However, over time this separation decreased. The primary driver was international pressure, symbolised by a decision by the governments charged with implementing the Dayton Accords in 2000 to build strong institutions at the state level, thus fundamentally changing the basis of the Dayton Accords. The process was facilitated by some internal factors as well. Moreover, unification became a requirement for Bosnia to integrate into European and NATO institutions, a powerful incentive for many. Recentralisation of the judiciary and police force had also made considerable progress.

International rather than domestic actors drove the military reform. The first step was to bring the Croat and Bosniak forces together. This process went fairly smoothly, the major instrument was a \$250 million Train and Equip programme, developed by the United States and funded by the US, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Brunei, to establish military parity between the Federation Army and the RS forces. In return the United States required that the Bosnian and Croatian forces be integrated at the upper levels, although not at the lower ones. The programme involved substantial amounts of equipment and training and joint planning at high levels.

The Office of the High Representative, the international institution charged with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, formed the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) and charged it to recommend military reforms which would allow Bosnia to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. The committee consisted of two members each from the central Bosnian government and each of three population groups with single members from the Office of the High Representative, NATO, and OSCE as well as the commander of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The DRC drafted a law that called for a Bosnian ministry of defence to take control of forces from the entities, and establish a single command structure and a single budget; however, the forces themselves would remain separate.

In the new scheme the Operational Command structure remained intact. The next major change was to create a new, state-level Support Command which became responsible for the functions previously given to the entities, in particular personnel and management. The policy of requiring that the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Joint Staff, and the head of the Operational Command be from the three different peoples in practice had meant that, when the civilian defence ministry changed hands, it might be necessary to change the senior military leaders as well, making these positions both unstable and politicised; therefore this policy was abandoned. Ethnic balance was retained by continuing the policy that the two senior deputies of each of these three offices be of the other two peoples. The entity defence ministries were to be disbanded.

The plan called for integration at lower levels than before. There were to be three regiments - one each made up of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, and each made up of three battalions. However, the regiments would not be operational units. Regiments are purely ceremonial organisations and unlike brigades have no operational, training or administrative roles. Brigades are the 'business organisations'. A regimental system embodies the historical military lineage of the component from which it is descended. It reflects symbols and accomplishments with which soldiers' identify and maintains the regimental heritage.

In terms of military efficacy, the primary success story is the creation and continued existence of a single armed force in place of three. Moreover, almost any "foreign" adversary is likely to represent one of the major ethnic groups in the military. While some Croats and Serbs fought with the Bosnians during the earlier wars, the Yugoslav Army as a whole came apart; it would not be surprising to see the Bosnian army do the same under the same circumstances. In terms of civilian control, the Yugoslav military was generally under tight civilian control; reflecting its communist heritage there was no tradition of military coups.

2. Burundi:

For decades, the Tutsi minority in Burundi dominated the army. In October 1993, the army went on a rampage, killing the elected president and thousands of Hutu civilians. In response, several Hutu militias were formed to fight the army and Tutsi supremacy. The fighting led to rebel gains and ultimately to negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, from 1996 to 2003, and in Sun City, South Africa, in 2003. South Africa played a leading role in the peace process, and its negotiators brought their experiences in peacemaking to the table, including expertise in the integration of security forces.

Hutu political groups were integrated on a piecemeal basis into a new government. A Ceasefire Monitoring Commission proposed a joint operational plan for disarmament and demobilisation. In January 2004, an integrated military high command - responsible for carrying out the

reform of the army - was established to work on a plan to integrate guerrillas of the National Congress for the Defence of Democracy- Forces (CNDD-FDD) into the security forces. The parties to the agreement were willing to implement part of the plan by separately disengaging and assembling their forces and respecting the cessation of hostilities. However, a lack of commitment and funds to carry out integration threatened the process. Instead, emphasis was placed on disarmament and demobilisation.

The World Bank-backed DRR effort faced political issues over the use of donor funding in such programmes. The transitional government and donors struggled to fund both the army's return to barracks and the CNDD-FDD forces reporting to assembly points. The Burundian government signed agreements with the CNDD-FDD forces, which stipulated that all of the militias would be brought in together with the army, jointly disarmed, and then integrated into what would be a transformed army and police force. The process was delayed by the government's slowness in producing a budget and financing the integration. The army was supposed to be working with the CNDD-FDD to create new security forces. However, the army was still deployed fighting the National Liberation Front (FLN).

Eventually, the DRR process moved forward. By November 2004, 50,000 CNDD-FDD combatants and army personnel had been demobilised, and 21,000 were in the cantonment areas. A total of 70,000 armed personnel reported, including 45,000 from the army, and they proceeded through the disarmament process. About 15,000 of those demobilised were children, handicapped, or old-age pensioners. By December 2005, more than 10,000 former soldiers from the Burundian Armed Forces had been demobilised. The Ministry of Defence reaffirmed its commitment to continue demobilisation until the National Defence Force was reduced to 30,000 personnel. In December 2004, integration into a new army and police force officially began. 10,000 to 12,000 of those disarmed went to the new police, and about 25,000-30,000 formed the nucleus of the new army. In May 2005, the UN Mission (ONUB), in cooperation with international donors, finalised a plan for a comprehensive reform of the security sector. Almost 10,000 former combatants were integrated into the new Force de Défense Nationale (FDN), and several thousand were integrated into the Burundi National Police (PNB).

Elections transformed Burundi's political landscape and paved the way for the initial success of integration. The electoral successes of the former CNDD-FDD combatants, especially the election of Pierre Nkurunziza as president on 19 August 2005, gave the party control of government. Concurrently, the security sector was restructured. The influence of the CNDD-FDD ensured that its fighters would make up 40 per cent of the army. Subsequently, the rapid integration of the army provided a safeguard against coup attempts that could have interrupted the peace process and guaranteed that further reforms required under the Arusha

agreement for peace and reconciliation would be realised. The deployment of the new police force, the PNB, throughout Burundi contributed to the smooth conduct of municipal and legislative elections.

The police integration process was carried out with some difficulty due to poor logistics and the training and reorientation of new elements. The necessity of training newcomers - former guerrillas or ex-government soldiers - for police work posed serious problems. In response, the government appealed to the international community for assistance in police training. By 2007, the integration process had made considerable progress, as evidenced by Burundi's pledge of 1,800 personnel from the integrated security forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia. The Burundian army had received external assistance from South Africa and other entities in training. However, before deploying to the difficult environment in Somalia, the contingent underwent peace operations training and equipping in Kenya.

A substantial peacekeeping force and intervention by a third party were essential in compensating for the weakness of the state in Burundi and in building trust among the parties so that the DDDR and integration processes could take place. External involvement and assistance by South Africa and other entities in the training of the integrated forces was essential for achieving success. The guerrilla forces were of sufficiently high quality to ensure that integration led to a professional military and officer corps and police force. Also, elections for a new government took place during the integration process, and the new government managed the integration process skillfully. While conflict continues in Burundi, the integration process has been a noteworthy achievement.

3. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which various regional countries took part has largely subsided, though large areas of the country, especially in the east, remain deeply unstable and insecure. After years of a bitter and disastrous conflict, a Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed in December 2002 in South Africa. This led to the establishment in June 2003 of a transitional power-sharing government, composed of representatives of the former government and a number of Congolese armed groups that had been involved in the conflict. The transitional government had the responsibility of uniting the country in preparation for national elections. By June 2003 it was estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 fighters in the DRC. One of the objectives of the peace agreement was the DDR into civilian life of an estimated 150,000 former fighters and the integration of the remainder into a unified national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo).

Building on the provisions contained in the Global and All Inclusive Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1522 states that "the reform

of the security sector, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, the effective restructuring and integration of the armed forces of the former Congolese belligerents and the establishment of a national police force are key element for the success of the transition process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

While DDR is viewed as an essentially civilian project and army reform as a military initiative there is nevertheless a fundamental link between the success of both. This inherent link is recognised in the national documents and operational plans governing the DDR and Army Reform programmes, which set out a “*tronc commun*”, or combined core, for the two programmes. The process under the “*tronc commun*” requires all fighters whether they are to enter the DDR programme or be recruited into the new army, to follow identical procedures, which involve awareness-raising, disarmament, identification and orientation. On 12 November 2004 a law regulating and organising the unified army (FARDC) came into force. Article 45 of the *Loi portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées* (Law on the General Organisation of Defence and the Armed Forces) recognised the key national military entities to take part in the process of integration into the FARDC.

The army reform plan drawn up by the Ministry of Defence and implemented by the SMI, enabled the creation of 16 military integration and retraining centres. These centres were selected on the basis of their capacity to accommodate up to 4,000 soldiers. Unlike the DDR programme, the army reform programme has suffered from lukewarm support from the international community, especially by the international financial institutions. In response, the Congolese government turned to bilateral cooperation to fund the programme and ensure technical support. In an experimental initiative, the government integrated and trained the 1st Brigade with Belgian support in March 2004 at Kisangani. This brigade was deployed in Ituri in late 2004 where security needs were greatest and where the limited deployment of MONUC forces had failed to restore security. The 2nd Brigade was integrated and trained at Kitona with the cooperation of Angola in March April 2005, and the 3rd Brigade was trained at Kamina with support from South Africa and Belgium in May-June 2005. In addition, during 2005 and in accordance with the emergency plan, and with technical and logistical support from Belgium and MONUC, the Congolese government integrated three other brigades.

The processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and Army reform are interdependent. The success of one depends on the success of the other, especially with regard to Awareness-Raising, Regrouping, Disarmament and Identification/Orientation activities. These are the activities that form part of the *Tronc Commun*, or combined core. The credibility of the whole process was also very much in doubt, particularly with locals who saw the newly integrated units using their new powers to intimidate and oppress rival ethnic groups. Furthermore, this

ethnic rivalry continued within the FARDC itself, and integrated militias began claiming areas/regions for themselves to operate in exclusively.

This process was not as successful as it could have been for a number of reasons: Rank alignment in terms of officer ranks was based on seniority within militia groups: Re-training and training did not take into consideration issues such as human rights, the rule of law and civil oversight: Whilst both unit and single combatant integration took place, soldiers would move towards leaders and brigades of their own ethnicity thus polarising the FARDC. Soldiers were reluctant to accept postings in regions where their ethnic group was not seen to be in charge. Old rivalries from the civil war remain and have led to an escalation in tensions between different brigades. Officers too were not immune from this ethnic rivalry; some militia leaders who were made senior ranking officers within the army (on account of their previous militia seniority) have simply built a personal support base of soldiers within the FARDC.

4. Mozambique:

Signed in October 1992, Mozambique's peace agreement called for the government and its opponent RENAMO to merge their armed forces on the basis of equal numbers to form a new 30,000 troop National Army. The high command of the new combined force was to consist of joint commanders from the government and RENAMO. Although the process of confinement and demobilisation of government and RENAMO troops proceeded slowly, the military power-sharing measures called for by the agreement were fully implemented in less than five years.

By 1992, the FRELIMO government accepted RENAMO as a movement with whom it should negotiate and whose guerrillas deserved consideration for integration into the new Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM). Peacemaking efforts brought a General Peace Agreement (GPA) between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO in Rome in October 1992. The UN Security Council then authorized a peacekeeping mission, ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique), with more than 7,000 military, police and civilian personnel to oversee the post-war transition to multiparty democracy and the DDR of a part of more than 200,000 persons who had been under arms.

ONUMOZ arrived in the latter half of 1993, and peacekeepers began the process of accepting government and RENAMO military personnel into assembly areas in November 1993; assembly of troops ended in August 1994. The demobilisation process was slow, starting in March 1994 and ending in August. More than 180,000 weapons were collected in the disarmament process, and more than 200,000 people ended military activities. The old government armed forces disbanded in August 1994 and were replaced by the new FADM. The GPA stipulated that the strength of the FADM would be 30,000 (24,000 army, 4,000 air force, and 2,000 navy), drawn equally from the ex-FAM and ex-RENAMO. A joint commission made up of the government, RENAMO, the United Kingdom,

Portugal and France supervised the formation of the FADM. The BMATT training centre at Nyanga, Zimbabwe, was used to train officers. The training started in March 1994 and produced a skeletal FADM by September. Two generals (one from each party) jointly led a transitional structure - the High Command. This dual structure trickled down to all levels of the armed forces and laid the foundation for the post-election force structure.

More government and RENAMO troops than were expected chose to end military careers, where conditions were less than satisfactory, to return to civilian life. The offer of over US\$1,000 for each soldier was added incentive. Military training continued until elections in October 1994 and afterward, with only 11,500 trained personnel and nine battalions in the new army by the end of 1994. By February 1995, the FADM had only 12,195 members (8,533 from FADM and 3,662 from RENAMO).

The GPA also led to a law creating a new police force, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) to replace the Mozambique People's Police (PPM). In addition, a new secret police (SISE) replaced the old (SNASP). A National Commission for Police Affairs (COMPOL) including RENAMO officers was formed as part of the implementation of the peace process. The PRM had a collective general command that would be equivalent to a national police commissioner. In practice, the PRM and SISE remained largely the same as the PPM and SNASP. In addition, a presidential guard was formed, and border protection and other special units were transferred from the army to the police. In the negotiations, no agreement was reached on integrating RENAMO personnel into the police force; integration came only later. Police issues were nonnegotiable during the negotiation and implementation phases, as the government alleged that Mozambique's sovereignty over the police should be maintained.

In 1994, a CIVPOL mission deployed to observe policing activities during the transition and helped to reassure RENAMO. During the demobilization and disarmament processes, CIVPOL officers found that government military troops and equipment were being transferred to the police, especially to the presidential guard. The government's quick reaction force continued to be active and was disbanded only two weeks before the election. The CIVPOL confirmed that the FRELIMO government appeared to be preparing a police force that was loyal to the party. The integration process in Mozambique thus faced problems that included low standards of education and training, a lack of objective criteria in the selection of police candidates, a predisposition among police officers to take bribes, and a lack of resources. The PRM grew from an estimated 18,000 in 1994 to more than 21,000 in 1998. A UNDP mission in the late 1990s helped to assess and upgrade the PRM. As a consequence of the assessment and upgrade, more than 300 officers were expelled, corruption was curbed, and crime-fighting potential was increased.

The Mozambican state was relatively weak; therefore, the necessary degree of external involvement by UN peacekeeping forces was higher. External involvement and assistance in training was quite important in building a cohesive military and police force. The key factors in managing the DRR processes were the promulgation and implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, international supervision, cash incentives, and the unattractiveness of careers in the security forces for ex-combatants. Ultimately, through training and upgrading, the FADM became effective enough to deploy on peacekeeping missions, and the PRM improved its crime-fighting capabilities. Reconstitution and integration have played a major role in democratic peacebuilding in Mozambique.

5. Namibia:

The war of independence in Namibia was less complex than the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and smaller in scale. Therefore, the reconstitution of the security sector was potentially less problematic. Unlike the case of Zimbabwe, the only guerrilla army in Namibia was the 10,000-strong Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) of the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). The South African Defence Force (SADF) had been fighting PLAN since 1966 in an effort to keep Namibia part of South Africa, and it was assisted by the 8,000-strong South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) and its counterinsurgency arm Koevoet ('crowbar' in Afrikaans) and by the South West African Police (SWAPOL).

In December 1988, a peace agreement was reached, which included provisions for integrating PLAN and SWATF troops into a Namibian Defence Force (NDF) and PLAN guerrillas and SWAPOL officers into a Namibian Police Force (NPF). The UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) was to supervise the demobilisation of forces, which would set the stage for integration. CIVPOL in Namibia oversaw the activities of SWAPOL and helped integrate the police force and create the NPF.

Unfortunately, as in Zimbabwe, the demobilisation process got off to a rough start, as PLAN guerrillas crossed into Namibia on 1 April 1989, and were attacked by the SADF for nine days. After winning the November 1989 elections, SWAPO formed a transitional government and invited the British government to send a BMATT contingent to train the new NDF. In less than a year, BMATT had trained five battalions, consisting of 70 percent ex-PLAN guerrillas and 30 percent ex-SWATF troops, with a total force strength of 7,500.

The integration process faced language barriers, hostility and distrust between former enemies, and a lack of infrastructure. However, BMATT instructors and new NDF officers were successful. BMATT-Namibia drew on lessons learned in Zimbabwe, concentrating advice and training at a more senior level and "training the trainers" of the rest of the NDF. The training course included both South African and Soviet-bloc techniques, which had been employed by ex-SWATF and ex-PLAN members respectively.

However, British Army methods were given precedence, which helped to integrate the NDF and foster a sense of Namibian identity.

As with Zimbabwe, politicisation was a problem. Because of the departure of most white SADF and SWATF officers, ex-PLAN officers tended to take the higher level positions in the NDF. Subsequently, the ex-PLAN officers politicised the NDF by openly supporting SWAPO. Also, corruption and a lack of accountability became a problem within the NDF. Nonetheless, only two of the Ministry of Defence's five director positions were given to former PLAN officers. The contribution of integration to permanent peace in Namibia was significant. Integration proved durable largely because it was on a smaller and less complex scale

If the integration process in Namibia was a success, the civilian reintegration was a failure. Neither the United Nations nor the new government planned any reinsertion or reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. After independence, many former soldiers of both sides failed to reintegrate economically. In response to protests from disaffected veterans, the government hastily designed a number of ad hoc activities. Consequently, the Namibian demobilisation and reintegration programme resembles a patchwork of well-intended programme responses rather than a strategic government policy and planned programme response.

With no coherent targeting mechanism in place and uneven registration to link ex-combatants to the benefits safety net, targeting leakages were numerous and substantial at all stages of the process. Reinsertion support consisted of a one-time severance to each unemployed ex-combatant. The objective of this policy was to address the basic needs of the ex-combatants. The Ministry of Defence estimated that as many as 40 per cent of eligible ex-combatants did not benefit from severance pay.

Reintegration assistance included employment support, rehabilitation and resettlement Programmes and vocational training. Immediately after independence, the government of Namibia employed an estimated 7,500 ex-combatants in the new army and the reformed police. The Development Brigade (DB) was established in 1991 to address the needs after repatriation of the many ex-combatants who had been unable to secure employment. The DB was purposefully restricted to the lower end of the vocational training market with emphasis being placed on practical training and employment.

The SWAPO government consolidated its hold on its core supporters and the state security apparatus by employing ex-combatants in public service, especially uniformed services. The Special Field Force (SFF) branch of the Namibian Police (Nampol) most clearly exemplifies the strategic and volatile position of the ex-combatants. Since the late 1990s it has incorporated thousands of ex-combatants and now outnumbers the Nampol personnel by nearly three to one. The SFF mainly patrols the borders but also supplements other Nampol branches elsewhere. It is

widely seen as a SWAPO, even presidential, force, while government officials maintain it is a neutral part of the police. The role and mode of operation of SFF has been continually controversial. The media and human rights organisations regularly report on the heavy-handed measures by the SFF against civilians, the SFF has a reputation for casual beating of suspected offenders. The SFF has become mandated to use violence beyond official rules and procedures, operating in the territorial, social and political margins of the state.

6. South Africa:

A series of conferences and agreements beginning in December 1991 culminated in the interim constitution agreed to in November 1993. On the military front, it was agreed that an estimated 30,000 personnel from forces other than the country's Defence Force, namely the African National Congress (ANC) and Homelands (i.e. Inkatha Freedom Party forces), were to be absorbed into a new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Although approximately 2,000 former guerrillas were summarily dismissed from the SANDF by President Mandela following a series of strikes and mutinies on their part, the integration of these so-called "non-statutory" forces was completed in 1997.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the 90,000-strong SADF was a highly regarded military, fighting fiercely for the survival of the apartheid regime, with operations mainly in other African countries. Similarly, the South African Police (SAP) was ferocious in attacking suspected enemies of apartheid inside the country. There was weak civilian control and parliamentary oversight over the SADF and SAP. The apartheid regime was also supported by the militias of the "homelands", Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei, which totalled 11,000 soldiers. The 28,000 guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), and the 6,000 guerrillas of the armed wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA), opposed the apartheid regime.

The dismantling of the apartheid regime from 1989 onward opened the door for majority rule four years later. The SADF, ANC/MK, and five other militias also began negotiations that eventually brought about an integrated South African National Defence Force (SANDF). In the negotiations, integration was favoured by the ANC/MK, because it would facilitate an ANC-led government gaining control over the armed forces and lead to the promotion of black officers. In opposition, SADF negotiators favoured absorption of the militias into an already well-established force, led primarily by white officers. Planning for the transformation and integration process began in early 1994. A Sub-Council on Defence was established to maintain oversight of the armed forces as the SANDF was created in time for the handover of power in April–May 1994. Planning and staff responsibility for the management of the planning process was delegated to a Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC). Working groups dealt with matters of personnel,

intelligence, and operations, as well as logistics and finances, and other groups dealt with issues involving the four services.

The integration process was controlled by the SADF and the ANC/MK. The ANC/MK succeeded in reaching compromise agreements with the SADF on the ranking and placement of non-SADF officers and on the management and oversight of the transformation and integration process during the post-election period. As in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the British armed forces were invited, this time as arbitrators overseeing the creation of the SANDF and the integration process. The planning process brought warring militias together and created the basis for a common institutional culture. SADF structures and rules and regulations circumscribed the capacity of ANC/MK to influence the process of creating a transformed and integrated SANDF. In 1994, ANC/MK's command and control structures within South Africa were weak, and officers involved in the planning process had to rely on their own political and military expertise in engaging SADF officers in negotiations. ANC/MK succeeded in shaping the new army but had little success in regard to the new navy and air force, and when integration began, most ex-ANC/MK officers entered the army, while few entered the navy and air force.

The 1994 transition placed ANC leaders into positions of power in the revamped Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the newly created Defence Secretariat provided civilian control over the military. The minister and deputy ministers of defence, Joe Modise and Ronnie Kasrils, resisted attempts by the chief of the SANDF, General Georg Meiring, to control how the restructuring of the SANDF and national defence would proceed. Also, ex-ANC/MK and progressive ex-SADF officers in the MoD and policy and planning and finance divisions of the Defence Secretariat succeeded in managing the Defence White Paper and Defence Review processes.

The 1996 White Paper on National Defence and the comprehensive Defence Review provided a blueprint for restructuring and integrating the military and the defence establishment and for expanding the peace dividend. From 1994 to 1998, personnel from ANC/MK and other non-SADF militias were absorbed into the former SADF, but there was little integration and transformation. Ex-SADF officers continued to occupy senior command and staff positions within the new SANDF, especially while ex-ANC/MK officers and others were involved in extensive training programmes. By 1998, there were shifts in the balance of power in the SANDF, and the integration process began in earnest. After a failed power play by General Meiring, he and other ex-SADF officers were compelled to retire from the SANDF, which opened the door to integration in the higher ranks. A cohort of ex-ANC/MK officers who had completed their compulsory training were promoted into senior command and staff positions. A mixed group of black and white officers asserted themselves, and the SANDF transformation and integration process accelerated.

In 2003, the SANDF transformation and integration process was declared complete. The process had contributed to a new institutional culture and produced a non-racist SANDF leadership under ANC government control. During the process, the SANDF maintained institutional cohesion and continued to execute its responsibilities. While the SANDF's size was reduced from 90,000 to 57,000 uniformed members, its effectiveness was not weakened greatly, as evidenced by the dispatch of peacekeeping forces to Burundi, the DRC and Liberia. On the negative side, HIV/AIDS has infected more than 20 per cent of the SANDF. On the whole, the transformation and integration of the SANDF was a major contribution to permanent peace in South Africa.

The SAP had a notorious reputation during the apartheid era for controlling and suppressing the black population and for widespread human rights abuses. Consequently, the Interim Constitution of April 1994 provided for the creation of a new and unified police force, the South African Police Service (SAPS). The new service inherited more than 140,000 personnel from the SAP and began the process of transformation into a representative and effective crime-fighting and public protection force. The door was opened to ANC/MK security personnel and others to join, be trained, and rise through the ranks to higher positions in the SAPS. The process was guided by White Papers, the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme, and a new national police commissioner. While progress in building an effective national police force was slow and painstaking, the new police force eventually became a positive force for peacebuilding.

7. Zimbabwe:

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 heralded the end of a protracted civil/independence war in Zimbabwe. Demobilisation of the military forces of the three parties (15,000 soldiers of the Rhodesian government, 30,000 fighters of the ZANU, and 20,000 fighters of the ZAPU) was an integral part of the peace process that followed upon the conclusion of the conflict. A British Commonwealth monitoring force of 1,300 supervised the pre-independence process and organised the assembly and cantonment of the ZANU and ZAPU forces and the confinement to barracks of Rhodesian armed forces. The newly established Joint High Command then administered the assembled forces and provided free rations, accommodation and a monthly allowance. Of the 65,000 encamped ex-combatants 29,000 were integrated in the new armed forces, while 36,000 were discharged and received reintegration assistance. Additionally 22,300 fighters who had been kept across the border were deemed eligible for reintegration assistance.

Zimbabwe is often viewed as a model for reconstituting the security sector through the integration of warring militias, which has guided subsequent peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in southern Africa. The anti-colonial war of the 1970s had resulted in three different armies operating in the country: the Rhodesian Army, the Zimbabwe African National

Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). ZANLA had made significant inroads in establishing a presence among the rural population in the eastern half of the country. In the peace negotiations, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government came to terms with the strength of both ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the December 1979 Lancaster House Agreement (ending the civil war) called for the integration of three forces into a Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

The planning and implementation of the integration of the three armies did not take place during the January–March 1980 transition period. The Commonwealth sent monitors to oversee the ceasefire, and requested that ex–Rhodesian Army officers take charge of the military training of ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas for integration into the structure of the old Rhodesian Army. Also, the old army stood by to intervene if the security situation were to deteriorate.

ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas were supposed to report to “assembly points” where they could be monitored and eventually either demobilised or sent for military training. The demobilisation of ZANLA and ZIPRA created the conditions for a possible coup by the 14,000-strong old Rhodesian army and its commander, Lieutenant General Peter Walls. However, both ZANLA and ZIPRA insured against a coup attempt. ZIPRA sent most of its approximately 5,500 troops inside Zimbabwe to assembly points but kept 6,000–8,000 in reserve in Zambia. At the same time, ZIPRA and its political party, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), worked towards the transition process.

ZANLA sent as many as 20,000 of its best-trained guerrillas from camps in Mozambique to areas of operation inside Zimbabwe. There they campaigned for their political party, ZANU(PF) (Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front) in the March 1980 elections and exercised control over the rural population in the eastern half of the country. ZANLA dispatched only 10,000–16,000 personnel (mostly auxiliaries and fresh recruits) to the assembly points. The unexpectedly large margin of victory by ZANU(PF) at the polls in the March 1980 elections helped to dissuade Lt. Gen. Walls and ex–Rhodesian Army commanders from attempting a coup.

As the coup threat subsided, the remaining ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas reported to the assembly points. However, before the integration process could begin, the identities of personnel in the assembly points had to be ascertained. Another obstacle was the financial burden of integration; it was not certain if the new government could pay. In the meantime, there was an exodus of white British South Africa Police (BSAP) force to South Africa and a rising demand for newly trained national police officers, as the BSAP was transformed into the new Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).

After the new government, headed by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of ZANU(PF), took power in March 1980, a Joint Military High Command

(JHC) was established to preside over the military integration process, "Operation Merger". Lt. Gen. Walls was commander, aided by senior commanders from the former Rhodesian Army and Air Force, ZANLA and ZIPRA. The command structures of the militias were treated as equals, to facilitate integration into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

The integration exercise welcomed all wishing to launch military careers into the ZNA. The plan was to fully train between 30,000 and 35,000 troops by the end of 1980, and ultimately reach a total of 45,000, which represented a compromise between a larger ideal strength of more than 60,000, and the need to contain costs. From ZANLA and ZIPRA, 9,500 members were expected to join the army. The remaining 23,000 guerrillas were to become reservists. Rather than relying on former Rhodesian Army officers, the new Zimbabwe government called on the United Kingdom to take a leading role in training the ZNA and for financial assistance. In June 1980, the British government responded by sending the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) to assist the JHC in creating and integrating the ZNA.

At BMATT's request, former ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders provided 300 leaders and 400 rank-and-file for each of the 15 planned battalions. The BMATT trained senior officers, middle-ranking officers, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers. After six weeks of basic infantry training, segments were combined before deployment to remote areas. By July 1980, battalions were being formed at the rate of two per month. However, plans to divert a large number of demobilised guerrillas to development work failed, and they, as well, had to be integrated into the ZNA, further accelerating the formation of battalions.

Lt. Gen. Walls, however, failed to expedite integration and to develop a working relationship with commanders from ZANLA and ZIPRA. After resigning, his position was taken over by the minister of state security and a nine-man supervisory committee, chaired by the minister of public works. A former Rhodesian Army commander was appointed as the commander of the integrated national army. In September 1980, the government decided that the ZNA would consist of five brigades, which were extended to absorb 45,000 of the 65,000 armed personnel. The overstretched BMATT numbered 150 against a ZNA strength of some 46,300. By December 1980, twelve fully trained battalions were complete. By March 1981, 19,500 ZANLA and ZIPRA veterans had been absorbed into fifteen new battalions that were being formed at the rate of three per month.

By early 1982, the integration process was complete, as brigadier generals and colonels assumed command positions after their training. The ZNA was larger than planned, with 65,000 troops. Fighting between former ZANLA and ZIPRA factions marred the integration process. In October 1980, an altercation occurred, and the following month, there was a confrontation near Bulawayo (Zimbabwe's second city).

Former ZANLA and ZIPRA senior commanders intervened and separated the perpetrators. However, a major conflagration erupted near Bulawayo in February 1981 that threatened the entire integration process. For one week, three of the existing fourteen battalions disintegrated into faction-fighting. Elements of the former Rhodesian Army and Air Force were called in to subdue these elements. Nonetheless, in spite of the faction fighting, JHC leaders were able to overcome the ill will in the ZNA and proceeded with the integration process, which was completed a year later.

The political conflict between ZAPU and ZANU(PF) escalated after the seizure of a number of arms caches on properties controlled by ZAPU. These seizures led to the arrest of ex-ZIPRA JHC commanders and slowed the building of the ZNA. The government later attempted to regain the confidence of ZAPU's ex-ZIPRA members of the ZNA by promoting some of their officers through the ranks. Because the problem was essentially political, these measures made little impact. The leader of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, was expelled from the government, and in March 1983 fled to London for a few months.

The Zimbabwean government's notorious Fifth Brigade subsequently crisscrossed Matabeleland targeting ZAPU supporters until ZAPU signed a unity agreement with ZANU(PF) in December 1987. As the ZNA developed, fewer ex-ZIPRA officers achieved high rank, rather, ex-ZANLA officers continued to be promoted, sometimes over better-qualified ex-ZIPRA officers. Many senior officers did not attend or complete senior training courses, as they were not required for promotion. The ZNA became increasingly politicised, with top generals overtly supporting President Mugabe and ZANU(PF). In February 1992, President Mugabe announced changes designed to put a stop to corruption, nepotism and decay in the ZNA.

Zimbabwe's lessons include: the need to prevent corruption and favouritism from developing, guarding against destabilisation during the transition process, and stopping inter-faction fighting. Nonetheless, the integration experience assisted the peacebuilding process, helped to reduce the bitterness between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU, and prevented the explosion of escalating tensions, especially during the Matabeleland crisis. The effectiveness of the integrated ZNA was satisfactory, in spite of corruption. For example, the ZNA fought well in Mozambique during the 1980s, in protecting the Beira Corridor from rebel attacks, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1998 to 2000, against rebel forces and Rwandan troops.

8. Philippines:

The settlement signed in September 1996 called for the integration of some 7,500 members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) military wing into the national army and security forces and the establishment of a regional security force in Mindanao. Implementation of the measures proceeded apace, with at least 6,750 MNLF members integrated into special and auxiliary units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) four years after the settlement was signed.

However, The Government of the Philippines order in October 1997 to integrate over 4,000 members of the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) into the AFP and the PNP took place without disarming the combatants. A number of incentives were offered, such as modest cash allowances, but this made little difference to the proliferation of weapons. The integration process into the AFP took three years whilst integration into the PNP took five years. The integration began with processing followed by individual training and then on-the-job training and deployment.

The training for integration into the AFP was carried out separately from the original AFP forces. Once completed, combatants would merge into existing AFP units. Integration into the PNP took place upon swearing an oath of allegiance, with training taking longer and then ex-combatants being individually assigned to various local police stations. A quota system was set up for different ranks; with quotas for officers, soldiers and auxiliary being filled by picking (choice made by leader of MNLF) and testing.

With MNLF combatants leaving a highly politicised and religious movement, there were initial problems between the 'integrees' and their new colleagues. The new recruits felt they were misunderstood, and were not used to the rigid hierarchical structures of the AFP and PNP as their movement emphasised equality between trainer and teacher. An 'internalisation' programme was then established for ex-combatants, which included countering their previous political beliefs and a psycho-cultural programme to harmonise the relationships between the ex-combatants and their new colleagues.

ANNEX B: SECONDARY CASE STUDIES

Angola – Azerbaijan – Cambodia – Chad – Chechnya – Djibuti – El Salvador – Eritrea – Ethiopia – South Ossetia – Haiti – Lebanon- Nicaragua – Rwanda – Uganda

1. Angola:

During the anti-Portuguese war (1961-1974) three guerrilla forces formed and operated in various regions of Angola. In April 1974, the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (MFA) took power in Portugal and ended the war. A tripartite plan for integration of the three forces was contained in the Alvor Agreement of December 1974. The Portuguese MFA governor in Angola agreed to supervise implementation. The agreement quickly began to unravel in February 1975, partly due to the fact that the units of the three guerrilla armies were allowed into the capital, Luanda, leading to faction fighting and the failure of integration. The MFA soon abandoned impartiality and sided with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against the other two movements. Subsequently, South Africa and Cuba intervened, and the conflict escalated.

In May 1991, peace accords were reached between the MPLA government and the UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebel movement. The UN Security Council authorized UNAVEM II (United Nations Angola Verification Mission II) to monitor the accords, but provided for only 548 personnel and a small budget. Unarmed military observers, 350 in number, were dispatched to 50 assembly points to monitor demobilisation and the formation of new integrated armed forces, which was supposed to be completed by the September 1992 elections. The Bicesse Accord settlement signed in May 1991 called for the creation of a single national military in which the army was to be evenly divided between government (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) troops. Although government troops and UNITA rebels began to gather at their respective assembly points and divest themselves of their arms, neither set of armed forces fully followed through on their commitments to demobilise and disarm.

By mid-1992, UNITA troops had been encamped but a large number of fighters remained hidden in the bush, the encamped troops were assembled with their families. Over a third of the regular army was encamped one year after the peace accord that resulted in high desertion rates. Moreover, weapons had been poorly guarded and stored in these camps; in effect, the encamped fighters had access to arms. Demobilisation itself started before complete encampment but remained incomplete at the time of elections. As a result, the merger of the two armed forces was not complete prior to the national elections held at the end of September of 1992. At the time the elections were held, only 45 per cent of MPLA troops had been demobilised and 24 per cent of the

forces assembled by UNITA had surrendered their weapons. UNITA withdrew from the integrated army in October.

The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, provided for the demobilisation of troops and the creation of a unified national army. The integrated army was to consist of approximately 90,000 troops with about 18,500 of those made up of UNITA soldiers. By early May 1998, 34,000 UNITA troops had been demobilised and 11,000 UNITA soldiers had been integrated into the army. Although the integration process was deemed concluded at this point and UNITA claimed to have completed the demobilisation process, UNITA was reported to have upward of 25,000 fully equipped troops and support militia in reserve.

In 1997, the UN tried again, this time sending several thousand peacekeepers in a peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission known as MONUA (United Nations Observer Mission in Angola), which included plans for the integration of security forces. However, MONUA failed in 1998 when UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, reneged on the peace agreement. The Angolan case provided an example of a failed peace and attempt to reconstitute the security sector, in a situation where the state was considerably weakened.

2. Azerbaijan:

The ceasefire accord agreed to in May 1994 called for the establishing of observer posts to be manned jointly by Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian troops. A provisional plan required the establishing of a minimum force of three battalions and three independent companies along the current line of contact between opposing forces, including the Lachin Corridor. The plan also called for supervising the withdrawal of troops to the agreed boundaries. The delay in implementing the plan is the result of a lack of consensus on the parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Although sporadic fighting still occurs, there has not been a return to civil war.

3. Cambodia:

Signed in October 1991, the Paris Agreement called for the regrouping, cantonment, and disarmament of at least 70 per cent of the forces of the four warring Cambodian factions – the communist Cambodian government, the *Khmer Rouge*, Son Sann's forces, and Sihanouk's forces – to begin in June 1992. Once these forces had been demobilised, the remaining 30 per cent of the factions' forces were to be incorporated into a new national army. The government's attempts to reduce the size of the military were part of its wider objective of relocating resources to more productive sectors. The Demobilisation Reintegration Project had four major components, personnel data management and information system, demobilisation, reintegration, and project implementation. The personnel data information system established a reliable military personnel database and developed a computerised payroll system. Many of the activities had been undertaken prior to the implementation of the project and would

continue to be a management tool for the military upon its completion. Although the Phnom Penh government and the two non-communist factions did cooperate to some extent in the demobilisation of their troops, the *Khmer Rouge* refused to regroup and disarm its forces.

4. Chad:

The demobilisation decision in Chad followed the armed overthrow of the Habre regime in December 1990. The new government proclaimed that the DRPs objective was to improve security and reinforce stability, democratisation, and national unity by building an integrated, professional and smaller army. Chad's primary foreign supporter, France, and other donors also made it clear that the demobilisation of a percentage of the armed forces and a reduction in military expenditure were important criteria for future assistance. However, despite substantial French technical and financial assistance, demobilisation was, at times, challenged by military factionalism; the strength of the military factions ability to block reforms if they did not perceive the reform to be in their interest. In Chad's initial demobilisation programme of 1991, some military commanders had little incentive to let troops go, and some worried all would depart once the substantial cash benefits were announced, thus diminishing their military strength. Without sufficient incentive or the commitment of key military stakeholders, demobilisation was vulnerable to reversal or slow implementation. After little progress in its first demobilisation attempt in 1991, the Chadians revised the terms of the programme and started a new DRP in 1992.

In both the 1991 and 1992 DRPs the programmes dealt only marginally with the issue of reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life. The programmes were designed by French and Chadian military planners, who hoped that civilian authorities would later develop appropriate reintegration projects and secure funding from donors. As the programme evolved the government began to rely on cash compensation at the expense of targeted reintegration programme. In a survey commissioned by the government of Chad less than one year after demobilisation, 22 per cent of ex-combatants were unemployed, 53 per cent had no financial capital, and 57 per cent had no material capital.

Signed in March 1996, the Franceville agreement, as well as subsequent agreements signed by the government and additional armed dissident groups, called for the integration of rebel forces into the Chadian army. Integration of rebel forces into the national army proceeded slowly, fitfully, and incompletely, with some former rebel groups accusing the government of reneging on commitments to integrate their soldiers into the regular armed forces. The government responded to these accusations with efforts to expedite the reintegration of rebel forces into the army.

5. Chechnya:

The settlement signed in August 1996 called for military power sharing measures designed to foster a mutual sense of security while Russian troops withdrew from the region by the end of the year. Checkpoints manned by both Chechen and Russian soldiers were to be established throughout the region. Six hundred fighters were designated to serve on joint Russian-Chechen patrols. Finally, joint offices were to be established to police the agreement, with about 2,000 men assigned to them. The measures called for by the settlement were implemented with the last Russian soldiers leaving the republic of Chechnya on 5 January 1997.

6. Djibouti:

Following the overthrow of the governments in neighbouring Ethiopia and Somalia in early 1991, the influx of around 100,000 refugees into Djibouti exacerbated already existing ethnic disparities. A civil war ensued in late 1991, which in one year of heavy fighting (1991-1992) resulted in major destruction of infrastructure in the northern districts. The war formally ended in December 1994 with the signing of the Peace Accord between the Government and the rebel Front pour la Restauration de L'Unite et de la Democratie (FRUD).

Demobilisation had already started before the end of the war in late 1993; the Government demobilised 4,096 soldiers under its own budget. The government financed demobilisation included disarmament, assembly in discharge centres, various administrative procedures and the payment of a departure allowance. Phase 1 demobilisation targeted 4,096 beneficiaries from the national army and police; this process did not envisage the provision of reintegration assistance. Civil disturbances instigated by discontent ex-combatant, resulted in a re-evaluation of the departure allowance and its increase to US\$2,000 for frontline service, and US\$1,000 for H.Q. service.

The reintegration element of the process consisted of social mobilisation, economic reintegration, social reintegration, and assistance to disabled ex-combatants. Benefits included access to: an information and counselling service; literacy training; grants for micro-projects; the provision of formal and informal training; job referral; community services and social activities; medical services for the disabled; and capacity strengthening. The project was conceived around the concept of the ex-combatant household, therefore the spouse and other dependents were eligible for certain types of assistance. For instance, a child could participate in a training course in place of an elderly or disabled ex-combatant.

7. El Salvador:

The Chapultepec agreement, signed in January 1992, called for the dismantling of several elements of the state security forces objected to by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), among them the military-controlled police forces that had been used to target the FMLN. The agreement mandates that these security forces be replaced by the creation of a new National Civilian Police in which former rebels and soldiers were to be integrated. These measures were fully implemented by the end of 1994.

8. Eritrea:

The border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which started on 6 May 1998, culminated when the two countries signed a Cessation of Hostilities on 18 June 2000. The cessation of hostilities was followed by a comprehensive Peace Accord being signed on 12 December 2000. During the two years of war the Government of Eritrea mobilised a large number of men and women to the armed forces. In November 2000, following the deployment of the UNMEE peacekeeping force and prompted by progress in the peace process, the government of Eritrea announced its intention to launch a demobilisation and reintegration programme, building on international experience and best practice.

The demobilisation component of the programme envisages collection of socio-economic profile, identification of vulnerable groups, assembly and disarmament, health screening, pre-discharge orientation, HIV-AIDS counselling, discharge procedures, transportation to the communities of choice, and counselling and sensitisation of host communities. Pre-discharge orientation would provide demobilised combatants with critical information about programme benefits, implementation arrangements at the central and provincial level, reintegration opportunities, health issues, civic rights and duties, and gender awareness. Reinsertion assistance includes the provision of financial and/or assistance in kind to cover the basic needs of ex-combatants families (transitional safety-nets) relative to the living standards of the general population. The TSN would cover a six-month period and would amount to US\$300 per demobilised combatant.

Reintegration consisted of social and economic reintegration. The objective of the social reintegration component would be to contribute to continued social cohesion in the communities and in the society at large. Economic reintegration activities are designed to develop the financial self-sufficiency of demobilised combatant's household through productive gainful employment. Activities to be included in these components include, information and sensitisation, social and economic referral services, first line and specialised counselling, provisions of skills development and training opportunities, micro-enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and referral services on employment, micro-projects, apprenticeship, training and education opportunities.

9. Ethiopia:

Ethiopia 1: Following 29 years of civil strife and prolonged guerrilla warfare, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power and established the Transitional government of Ethiopia (TGE) in May 1991. The TGE created the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans. The immediate objective of the Commission was to contribute to the restoration of security and stability by restricting the movement of soldiers to transit centres. The long-term goal was to resettle ex-combatants and to facilitate their peaceful, productive, and self-sustained social and economic reintegration into society.

Demobilisation consisted of three phases: assembly, pre-discharge orientation, and transportation. A lack of food, potable water and shelter, combined with overcrowding and the poor physical condition of ex-combatants, posed a serious health risk during extended encampment periods. A transitional safety net package was provided as a form of reinsertion assistance. Its objective was to address the immediate basic needs of the demobilised ex-combatants. This package provided ex-combatants with financial and in-kind assistance starting immediately after the ex-combatants reported to their communities.

The Commission adopted one general strategy and four sub-categories during reintegration. The general strategy contained several related elements. First, the minimum necessary assistance that each category required was identified to enable ex-combatants to achieve the same social and economic status as average civilians. Second, the reintegration programmes were prioritised according to their implementation complexity. Third, an integrated and simple institutional structure with decentralised decision making was adopted.

Ethiopia 2: On 6 May 1998, fighting broke out between the armed forces of the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The conflict continued for more than two years and was characterised by relatively short bursts of heavy fighting, resulting in significant casualties. On 18 June 2000, the two governments signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

The Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme was implemented in two phases. The first phase consisted of the demobilisation of 17,000 disabled and 42,000 able-bodied ex-combatants, and provided care to the severely disabled as well as economic assistance to able-bodied ex-combatants. The second phase foresaw the demobilisation of around 90,000 additional able-bodied ex-combatants.

The demobilisation and reintegration process consists of three distinct phases, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration. Demobilisation involved the assembly of beneficiaries in one location, the provision of a non-transferable ID card and the establishment of a database on the beneficiary population and the collection of socio-economic data.

Reinsertion provided a short-term safety net to facilitate the ex-combatants start up costs during reinsertion in to their communities. Reintegration activities were to be based on the data collected during the demobilisation phase. A range of activities were available which took account of the specific situation in different regions, and the needs and aspirations of the ex-combatants. Furthermore, reintegration activities were to cater for the differing requirements of rural, urban and social reintegration, as well as the specific needs of special target groups such as the disabled and women.

10. Georgia, South Ossetia:

Under the Russia-Georgia Dagomys Accord and Sochi Ceasefire Agreement concluded in June/July 1992, a mixed peacekeeping force consisting of a Russian regiment of the Airborne Division and Georgian and South Ossetian units was inserted into the contested zone. The mandate of the Joint Peacekeeping Force extends to policing ceasefires, serving on checkpoints, and control of the situation on the ground through military patrols on a regular basis. Although the agreement called for an equal proportion of troops numbering 500 personnel each, because of a lack of volunteers and the poor equipment of the Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers, Russia took the lead role in the Joint Peacekeeping Force.

11. Haiti:

In September 1994, the US Agency for International Development/Office of Transitional Initiatives (USAID/OTI) designed a programme to demobilise the Haitian armed forces, and assist in their reintegration into society. OTI then provided the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) with a grant to implement the programme. This demobilisation and reintegration programme became operational in November 1994, and was formally completed in November 1996.

The Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme in Haiti differs from many of the other programmes examined in that it had overtly political and transitional objectives, as apposed to economic and developmental objectives. The objectives were stated as being, to neutralise the short-term threat of former government soldiers in Haiti so as to protect US forces, and assist in their mission; provide long-term breathing space from possible ex-government forces disruption to allow transitional activities to occur; and lay the foundation for the eventual reintegration of former government forces into society.

The demobilisation programme had several components: registration, orientation, vocational training, stipends, and an opportunity and referral service. The registration process involved disarmament, socio-economic data collection, issuing of a civilian ID card, and information on orientation. Orientation sessions provided information on the demobilization programme, highlighted the challenges of reintegration into civilian life, prepared ex-combatants for the social and economic

adjustments of reintegration, and provided information for ex-combatants to decide on vocational training. Vocational training courses were offered to all registered ex-combatants, in established vocational training schools. The Haitian government agreed to pay each ex-combatant participating in the IOM programme a stipend for as long as they were in training, to a maximum of six months. The stipend was set at 1,500 gourdes per month (approximately US\$100). Many ex-combatants found difficulty in finding employment following their vocational training and turned to IOM for assistance. IOM institutionalised this assistance by establishing the Opportunity and Referral Service.

12. Lebanon:

The Taif Accord, signed in October 1989, called for Lebanese militias to transfer their weapons to the Lebanese government, disband as militias, and re-form as part of internal security forces. An exception was made for Hizballah, which was allowed to retain its military wing in order to fight against the Israeli security presence in the country. Many militias did disband, or have at least been contained to their local territory, and most are largely disarmed. Some of the militias have been integrated into the national army.

13. Nicaragua:

The decision to demobilise was the result of extensive regional and internal negotiations. On 7 August 1989, after a decade of civil war between the Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) and the Sandinistas, regional Presidents signed the Tela Accord which called for the NR to voluntarily disarm and accept repatriation to Nicaragua. Demobilisation lagged until the election of the National Opposition Union (UNO) on 25 February 1990. One month after the elections the Toncontin Accord was signed which provided for the disarmament and demobilisation of the NR. These peace agreements did not address demobilisation of the Sandinistas People's Army (EPS) and no arrangements were made for restructuring of the regular armed forces, or for the integration of any of the NR into the regular army.

On 19 April 1990, the leaderships of the EPS and NR agreed to a ceasefire and a timetable for demobilising NR troops. A series of provided for a number of military power sharing measures. These include allowing Contra forces to have their own security forces in their "development poles" (settlement areas to be set aside for former Contra forces); a promise to protect the existing privileges and rank of Sandinista officers serving in the national army; a promise not to replace these officers with ex-members of the National Guard or the Contras; and the retention of Sandinista General Humberto Ortega as head of the armed forces. These measures were implemented, although resource scarcity meant few funds were available for the development poles and Ortega supervised a large reduction in the size of the armed forces.

Demobilisation and initial reintegration were planned and coordinated along with the peace process. Comprehensive programmes were designed in advance, which addressed the many short-term needs of combatants and their families. After the initial six month programme the effort was expanded to include development projects and long-term support.

14. Rwanda:

After a prolonged and inconclusive military struggle, the government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front signed a Peace Accord in August 1993, setting forth the principles, terms and conditions of peace. These included the demobilisation and reintegration of 36,700 members of military and police forces who were not to join the planned new unified National Army and National Gendarmerie.

The Arusha peace accord signed in August 1993 called for the integration of the armed forces and the gendarmie. 60 per cent of the troops in the new army were to be composed of government forces, 40 per cent of rebel forces. Command posts were to be evenly divided between the two sets of forces. The protocol calls for demobilisation, disengagement, and integration of the new army to be completed between seven to nine months. The Rwandan government prevaricated for months on implementing the accords, including the integration of security forces. In fact, the prospect of integration fuelled the militias who were plotting the genocide.

The 1994 genocide demonstrated the importance of following through on the process of reconstituting security forces. In August 1993, the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was able to win concessions from the Rwandan government in the Arusha Accords, which called for a new integrated army. Under the accords, 50 per cent of the officers and 40 per cent of the enlisted personnel would be from the RPF. The UN Security Council authorised a peacekeeping force, UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda), to monitor the integration process, but without enforcement powers.

15. Uganda:

After fifteen years of civil strife and prolonged guerrilla warfare that left Uganda with a war-torn economy and society, the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986. Rebellion and banditry afflicted different parts of the country until 1991. Once military opposition was defeated in 1991, the government decided to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from defence and security to the promotion of social and economic development. This shift in expenditure entailed the phased demobilisation and subsequent reintegration into productive civilian life between 1992 and 1995 of 36,353 of the estimated 90,000 soldiers in the National Resistance Army (NRA).

The three objectives of the Ugandan DRP were: (i) the demobilisation and resettlement of veterans and their families; (ii) facilitation of their social

and economic reintegration into a peaceful, productive, and sustainable civilian life; and (iii) restructuring of public expenditure with a view to increasing the funds available for priority programmes, especially those allocated for economic and social infrastructure and services.

The Ugandan demobilisation was the outcome of rational and professional personnel management by the army. It was recognised early in the planning process that the programme would impact the ex-combatants' families and the host communities; the programme provided some support to spouses and families. A socio-economic profile of beneficiaries was developed along with an analysis of the opportunities for ex-combatants, which informed the design of settling-in packages and reintegration programme.

In order to facilitate the ex-combatants' return to civilian life, a pre-discharge orientation programme was offered during demobilisation to ex-combatants and their families. Transport was provided to every ex-combatant and his/her family and belongings for the discharge centres to the district of destination. The transitional safety net package included cash payments to assist ex-combatants for six-months, financial support for children's primary education and shelter for families. An education and training support fund was introduced to assist with reintegration. The fund enabled ex-combatants to continue with formal education, attend a vocational training institution, or participate in a scheme that provided on-the-job training and advice by master craftsmen.

ANNEX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aboobaker, I. 2008. *'South Africa's Military Negotiations in the creation of the new South African National Defence Force'*. Berghof Unpublished.
- Abdullaev, K. and C. Barnes (eds). 2001. *'Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace process.'* Accord, Conciliation Resources, London, 2001.
- Amnesty International. 2007. *'DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army'*, January 2007.
- Blattman. C. and Miguel. E. 2009. *'Civil War'*. Working paper Number 166, Centre for Global Development. March 2009.
- Burgess, S.F. 2008. *'Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict'*, African Security, 1:2, 69 – 91.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2004. *'The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars'*, Security Studies, 13:4, 230 -279.
- Edmonds, M, & Mills, G. & McNamee,T. 2009. *'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo'*, African Security,2: 1,29 -58.
- Fithen, C. 2009. *'The Legacy of Four Vetting Programs: An Empirical Review'* Security System Reform Program,International Center for Transitional Justice, February 2009.
- Glassmyer, K. and Sambanis, M. 2008. *'Rebel Military Integration and Civil War Termination'* Journal of Peace Research. 2008; 45; 365
- Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. 2006. *'From anarchy to security: Comparing theoretical approaches to the process of disarmament following civil war'*, Contemporary Security Policy,27:1,155 — 167
- Hendrickson. D. *'Cambodia's security-sector reforms: limits of a down-sizing strategy'* Conflict, Development & Security.
- Hoddie. M. and Hartzell. C. 2003. *'Arrangements Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing'* Journal of Peace Research, 2003; 40; 303
- I.C.G. 2008, *'Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform'* Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing N°50, October 2008
- Knight.M. 2009 *'SSR, Democracy & the Social Contract: from implicit to explicit.'* Journal of Security Sector Management, Volume 7 Number 1, February 2009.

Knight. M. 2008. *'Negotiating Security: Issues for Resistance/Liberation Movements negotiating DDR & SSR in peace agreements'*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Knight.M, & Ozerdem. A. 2004. *'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace'*, Journal of Peace Research, 41(4), July 2004.

Knight, W.A. 2008. *'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview'*. African Security, 1:1,24-52.

Licklider. R. 2009. *'New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil War'*. Unpublished, Rutgers University.

Marriage, Z. 2007. *'Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo'*, Conflict, Security & Development,7:2,281-309.

Menocal. A.R. & Eade. D. 2005. *'Annotated resources on peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction'*. Development in Practice, Volume 15, Number 6, November 2005

Metreveli, E, et al. 2009. *'State Approach to National Integration in Georgia, Two Perspectives'*. Silk Road Paper, February 2009.

N'Diaye, Boubacar. 2009. *'Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation: Plus Ça Change ...'*, African Security, 2:1,1 — 28

Porch, D. and Rasmussen, M.J. 2008 *'Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?'*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:6,520-540.

Rupiah, M. 1995. *'Demobilisation and Integration: Operation Merger and the Zimbabwe National Defence Force, 1980-1987'*, in *'Dismissed: demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in Africa'*, Institute for Defence Policy
Published by Institute for Defence Policy, 1995.

Rupiah, M. 1996. *'The expanding Torrent: british Military Assistance to the Southern African Region'*, Africa Security Review, 5 (4): 51-59.

Vines, Alex, Oruitemeka, Bereni and Oruitemeka, Bereni. 2008. *'Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola'*, Conflict, Security & Development, 8:2, 241-263.